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Stephen A. Wandner
From Workforce Research 
to Workforce Policy 
Otto von Bismarck is reported to 
have said that laws are like sausages; 
it is better not to see them made. And 
like sausages, legislation is improved by 
quality ingredients. Rigorous research 
can be a vital ingredient that improves 
the fi nal policy and legislative product. 
The use of research to shape legislative 
development, however, should not be 
assumed. A forthcoming book published 
by the Upjohn Institute, Solving the 
Reemployment Puzzle: From Research 
to Policy (Wandner 2010), traces the use 
and misuse of research as it informed 
and guided workforce public policy 
during the Clinton and George W. Bush 
presidencies. (To order the book, see the 
order form on the back cover or visit 
www.upjohn.org).
The new book closely examines the 
process by which eight social science 
experiments changed workforce 
development laws and policies. The 
experiments are analyzed through 
their entire policy process: experiment 
initiation, implementation, and evaluation; 
policy development; legislative 
enactment; program development; and 
program implementation. 
The experiments all examined ways to 
return to work dislocated workers eligible 
to collect unemployment insurance 
(UI); hence, they were called the “UI 
Experiments.”
The UI Experiments resulted in 
policy proposals and federal legislation 
despite a hostile economic, fi scal, and 
political environment. In some ways, they 
succeeded because they anticipated and 
surmounted the diffi cult environment of 
the 1980s.
The experiments operated under at 
least three important environmental 
constraints. First, they were developed 
during the early and mid-1980s, a period 
of high unemployment. Thus, there 
was a clear need to help the long-term 
unemployed return to work.
Second, the experiments were 
conducted during a period of budget 
stringency. Conscious of fi scal 
constraints, the researchers designed 
the experiments to test whether the 
treatments could provide net benefi ts to 
the U.S. Department of Labor to enhance 
the chances that they could be enacted.
Third, the experiments operated in 
a partisan environment both within 
Congress and between Congress and the 
executive branch. Experimental methods 
were used precisely in order to yield 
rigorous results that all parties would fi nd 
convincing, since evaluations based on 
experimental methods are more likely to 
satisfy policymakers, regardless of their 
political philosophy. These methods are 
especially important in a time of divided 
and contentious government in order to 
enact into federal law new workforce 
policy that entails additional federal 
expenditures.
There are lessons to be learned from 
these experiments because they operated 
under many similar environmental 
constraints relating to diffi cult labor 
market conditions, severe federal and 
state budget constraints, and contentious 
governmental relations.
The UI Experiments: Policy Proposals 
and Legislation
Between 1986 and 1996, eight UI 
Experiments were conducted, searching 
comprehensively for new or improved 
interventions that might expedite 
workers’ return to work and improve 
their work skills. The interventions tested 
were intensive job search assistance 
(JSA), training, relocation assistance, 
reemployment bonuses, self-employment 
assistance (SEA), and an enhanced UI 
work test.
The New Jersey Experiment was 
a multitreatment project that tested 
four interventions: 1) comprehensive 
job search assistance, 2) training, 
3) relocation assistance, and 4) 
reemployment bonuses. The other 
experiments tested only one intervention: 
comprehensive JSA (District of Columbia 
and Florida), self-employment assistance 
(Massachusetts and Washington), 
reemployment bonuses (Pennsylvania 
and Washington), and an enhanced UI 
work test (Maryland).
Six of the experiments provided 
promising results that were developed 
into policy proposals (see Table 1). The 
comprehensive JSA from the New Jersey 
Experiment was used as the foundation 
for launching the Worker Profi ling 
and Reemployment Services (WPRS) 
system enacted into federal law in 1993. 
Later that year, SEA was temporarily 
enacted based on the interim report of 
the SEA experiment that had operated in 
Massachusetts. The SEA program was 
made permanent in 1998, after the fi nal 
SEA evaluation was published. In 1994, 
reemployment bonuses were incorporated 
into the Clinton administration’s 
proposed Reemployment Act—a 
reauthorization of federal workforce 
legislation—but the legislation stalled 
in Congress and was never enacted. In 
2003 and 2005, reemployment bonuses 
reemerged as a Bush administration 
legislative proposal in the form of 
Personal Reemployment Accounts.
The remainder of this article focuses 
on two interventions discussed in the 
book—comprehensive JSA and SEA—
where positive experimental results 
guided the design of federal legislation 
and produced successful programs that 
help the unemployed return to work.
The Case of Comprehensive Job 
Search Assistance
A series of reemployment experiments 
were proposed to Bill Brock after he 
Between 1986 and 1996, eight 
UI Experiments were conducted, 
searching for new or improved 
interventions that might 
expedite workers’ return to 
work and improve their skills.
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became Secretary of Labor in April 
1985. Brock had been Special Trade 
Representative and was familiar with 
the issue of worker dislocation. He 
eagerly approved a budget proposal 
to launch a set of experiments dealing 
with dislocated workers, but he insisted 
that the New Jersey Experiment begin 
immediately using existing research 
funds rather than wait for a new 
congressional appropriation. Believing 
strongly in research, Brock fi rmly 
supported initiating the experiments, 
though he knew he would not oversee 
their completion as secretary.
The New Jersey Experiment was 
conducted in 1986 and 1987, and the 
fi nal evaluation was completed two years 
later (Corson et al. 1989). The evaluation 
showed that comprehensive JSA reduced 
UI-compensated durations by half a week 
to all workers offered the treatment. The 
treatment resulted in a fi nding that the 
cost of providing the services would 
be more than offset by the benefi ts to 
the government. If policymakers were 
convinced by the evaluation report, 
comprehensive JSA could be provided 
with a federal budgetary savings.
The fi ndings from the 1989 evaluation 
and a series of multiyear follow-up 
reports were widely circulated. Briefi ngs 
were held in Washington, DC, for each 
of the evaluation reports. The reports 
were distributed to state workforce 
agencies, researchers, policy analysts, 
and policymakers. At a 1991 briefi ng of 
minority and majority staff members of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, 
all members agreed that the experimental 
evaluation results were convincing and 
that comprehensive JSA was highly cost 
effective. 
In March 1993, less than a month after 
becoming the Secretary of Labor, Robert 
Reich was faced with high unemployment 
requiring the extension of emergency 
UI benefi ts. In response, he wanted to 
do something innovative. Cognizant of 
the results of the New Jersey experiment 
from her time as UI Administrator, 
Carolyn Golding, the acting assistant 
secretary for the Employment and 
Training Administration, suggested he 
consider comprehensive JSA. Larry Katz, 
Reich’s chief economist, supported the 
proposal—he had read the New Jersey 
Experiment evaluation and had used it as 
a reading for his Harvard graduate labor 
economics class. Reich’s chief of staff, 
Kitty Higgins, supported the proposal, 
having been briefed on the experiment 
when she was legislative assistant to 
Representative Sander Levin, who 
served on the House Ways and Means 
Committee. 
Clinton approved the proposal, 
and Congress enacted the extension 
of emergency benefi ts with the JSA 
provisions with bipartisan support. 
Clinton signed the legislation into 
law on March 4, 1993. Now the 
Labor Department was charged with 
implementing this new program in the 
states.
With unprecedented support from 
three key department programs—the UI, 
Employment Service (ES), and training 
programs—the WPRS system was 
successfully implemented nationwide 
by mid-1996. A newly developed 
worker profi ling statistical mechanism 
allowed state UI programs to identify 
UI benefi ciaries who were permanently 
displaced and likely to exhaust their 
UI benefi ts. Targeted workers were 
referred to One-Stop Career Centers 
where ES workers provided them with 
reemployment services, and some of 
these workers were referred to training 
programs. 
In recent years the WPRS system has 
screened 6–12 million UI benefi ciaries 
and has referred over 1.0 million of these 
UI benefi ciaries to the One-Stops to 
receive WPRS reemployment services. 
The WPRS system works as both a 
targeting tool to identify workers in 
need of reemployment services and as 
an allocation tool to effectively provide 
these services consistent with state and 
local workforce budgetary constraints.
Self-Employment Assistance
 
SEA was tested in Massachusetts, 
providing self-employment allowances 
to UI-eligible workers in lieu of regular 
UI benefi ts. This intervention also 
was found to provide net benefi ts to 
the Department of Labor. SEA was a 
fundamental change in the way that 
UI benefi ts are paid. While regular UI 
requires that unemployed workers search 
for wage and salary employment, the 
SEA program relaxes that requirement 
and allows workers to draw benefi ts as 
long as they are laboring full time to 
Table 1  The Unemployment Insurance Experiments: Evaluations and 
Legislative Activity
NOTE: Most of the data and fi nal reports from these experiments are available at ERDC on our 
Web site: www.upjohn.org.
Intervention Experiment Evaluation Legislation
Job search 
assistance
New Jersey 1989—Final report
1991—Four-year follow-up
1995—Six-year follow-up
1993—Worker Profi ling and 
Reemployment Services 
(enacted)
Self-employment 
assistance
Massachusetts 1991—Interim report
1995—Final report
1993—Self-Employment 
Assistance (enacted for fi ve 
years)
1998—Self-Employment 
Assistance (permanently 
enacted)
Reemployment 
bonuses
Illinois 
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Washington
1987—Final report
1989—Final report
2002—Final report
2002—Final report
1994—Reemployment Act 
(not enacted)
2003 & 2005—Personal 
reemployment accounts 
(not enacted)
For research to affect policy, 
political leaders in both the 
executive branch and Congress 
must commit to funding, 
conducting, and using research.
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start their own businesses. Unemployed 
workers create their own jobs by starting 
microenterprises, and they may employ 
other workers as well. 
SEA was the other UI Experiment that 
both yielded a Clinton administration 
legislative proposal and was enacted 
into federal law. SEA is a voluntary 
state program that must be adopted by 
individual states and made a part of their 
state UI laws. Less than a dozen states 
have adopted the program, and usage has 
been limited to a few thousand workers 
a year. Nevertheless, the SEA program 
holds promise as a practical option for 
some workers to create their own jobs 
and, based on experimental results, to 
earn more money than workers who are 
not offered this option. 
Conclusion
Rigorous research can have a major 
impact on federal workforce public 
policy and legislation. For research to 
affect policy, political leaders in both 
the executive branch and Congress must 
commit to funding, conducting, and using 
research. Implementing research fi ndings 
requires that government workers at 
the national, state, and local levels be 
supportive of the research results and 
use them to develop new and innovative 
programs and processes. When 
policymakers use research results as a 
prominent ingredient in policymaking, 
they are more likely to develop cost-
effective policy that works. However, 
when the research is not conducted or the 
research results are ignored, policy and 
programs suffer.
WPRS and SEA are success stories. 
WPRS helps expedite the return to 
work of dislocated workers. The Obama 
administration and Congress recognized 
this contribution by including $250 
million in Recovery Act funds for 
reemployment service grants that have 
provided funds to provide comprehensive 
JSA. While the SEA program needs more 
encouragement and more entrepreneurial 
training funds to expand its scope, its 
success in the states with SEA programs 
demonstrates the promise of permitting 
unemployed workers to create their own 
jobs and to increase their earnings by 
starting their own microenterprises.
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